The biological cost of consciousness

Some philosophers maintain that consciousness as subjective experience has no biological function. However, conscious brain events seem very different from unconscious ones. The cortex and thalamus support the reportable qualitative contents of consciousness. Subcortical structures like the cerebellum do not. Likewise, attended sensory stimuli are typically reportable as conscious, while memories of those stimuli are not so reportable until they are specifically recalled. 

Reports of conscious experiences in normal humans always involve subjectivity and an implicit observing ego. Unconscious brain events are not reportable, even under optimal conditions of report. While there are claimed exceptions to these points, they are rare or poorly validated. 

Normal consciousness also implies high availability (rapid conscious access) of the questions routinely asked of neurological patients in the Mental Status Examination, such as common sense features of personal identity, time, place, and social context. Along with “current concerns,” recent conscious contents, and the like, these contents correspond to high frequency items in working memory. While working memory contents are not immediately conscious, they can be rapidly re-called to consciousness. 

The anatomy and physiology of reportable conscious sensorimotor contents are ultraconserved over perhaps 200 million years of mammalian evolution. By comparison, full-fledged language is thought to arise some 100,000 years ago in homo sapiens, while writing, which enables accel-erated cultural development, dates between 2.5 and 6 millennia. Contrary to some claims, therefore, conscious waking precedes language by hundreds of millions of years. 

Like other major adaptations, conscious and unconscious brain events have distinctive biological pros and cons. These involve information processing efficiency, metabolic costs and benefits, and behavioral pros and cons. The well known momentary limited capacity of conscious contents is an example of an information processing cost, while the very large and energy-hungry corticothalamic system makes costly metabolic demands. 

After a century of scientific neglect, fundamental concepts like “conscious,” “unconscious,” “voluntary” and “non-voluntary” are still vitally important, because they refer to major biopsychological phenomena that otherwise are difficult to discuss. 
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How conscious experience and working memory interact

Active components of classical working memory are conscious, but traditional theory does not account for this fact. Global Workspace theory suggests that consciousness is needed to recruit unconscious specialized networks that carry out detailed working memory functions. The IDA model provides a fine-grained analysis of this process, specifically of two classical workingmemory tasks, verbal rehearsal and the utilization of a visual image. In the process, new light is shed on the interactions between conscious and unconscious\ud aspects of working memory

A Cognitive Science Based Machine Learning Architecture

In an attempt to illustrate the application of cognitive science principles to hard AI problems in machine learning we propose the LIDA technology, a cognitive science based architecture capable of more human-like learning. A LIDA based software agent or cognitive robot will be capable of three fundamental, continuously active, humanlike learning mechanisms:\ud 1) perceptual learning, the learning of new objects, categories, relations, etc.,\ud 2) episodic learning of events, the what, where, and when,\ud 3) procedural learning, the learning of new actions and action sequences with which to accomplish new tasks. The paper argues for the use of modular components, each specializing in implementing individual facets of human and animal cognition, as a viable approach towards achieving general intelligence

LIDA: A Working Model of Cognition

In this paper we present the LIDA architecture as a working model of cognition. We argue that such working models are broad in scope and address real world problems in comparison to experimentally based models which focus on specific pieces of cognition. While experimentally based models are useful, we need a working model of cognition that integrates what we know from neuroscience, cognitive science and AI. The LIDA architecture provides such a working model. A LIDA based cognitive robot or software agent will be capable of multiple learning mechanisms. With artificial feelings and emotions as primary motivators and learning facilitators, such systems will ‘live’ through a developmental period during which they will learn in multiple ways to act in an effective, human-like manner in complex, dynamic, and unpredictable environments. We discuss the integration of the learning mechanisms into the existing IDA architecture as a working model of cognition

Imprint Academic

Abstract: Can we make progress exploring consciousness? Or is it forever beyond human reach? In science we never know the ultimate outcome of the journey. We can only take whatever steps our current knowledge affords. This paper explores today's evidence from the viewpoint of Global Workspace (GW) theor

Biology of Consciousness

The Dynamic Core and Global Workspace hypotheses were independently put forward to provide mechanistic and biologically plausible accounts of how brains generate conscious mental content. The Dynamic Core proposes that reentrant neural activity in the thalamocortical system gives rise to conscious experience. Global Workspace reconciles the limited capacity of momentary conscious content with the vast repertoire of long-term memory. In this paper we show the close relationship between the two hypotheses. This relationship allows for a strictly biological account of phenomenal experience and subjectivity that is consistent with mounting experimental evidence. We examine the constraints on causal analyses of consciousness and suggest that there is now sufficient evidence to consider the design and construction of a conscious artifact

One, not two, neural correlates of consciousness

Although we admire Ned Block's effort to include cognitive neuroscience in his philosophical work, we cannot agree with his interpretation of the evidence [ 1 ]. Block has long argued that there are two kinds of consciousness: ‘phenomenological consciousness’ (what we experience) and ‘access consciousness’ (roughly, the information we can access via conscious experiences). In Baars' theoretical work on Global Workspace Theory [ 2 , 3 ] that point is made more simply: the contents of visual consciousness, for example, clearly require visual cortex. But activity in visual cortex, although necessary, is not sufficient for conscious qualities, as the brain evidence so clearly shows. Without parietal and prefrontal activation, researchers such as Dehaene et al. [ 4 ] find no correlation of visual cortical activity with consciousness. Similarly, Laureys et al. [ 5 ] have shown that when frontoparietal regions are impaired, there is no evidence for sensory consciousness, despite activation of sensory cortices [ 6 , 7 ]. The obvious inference is that unconscious brain mechanisms interact with visual cortex to make visual qualities possible. But why should such interactions be said to involve ‘access consciousness’

The Disunity of Consciousness

It is commonplace for both philosophers and cognitive scientists to express their allegiance to the "unity of consciousness". This is the claim that a subject’s phenomenal consciousness, at any one moment in time, is a single thing. This view has had a major influence on computational theories of consciousness. In particular, what we call single-track theories dominate the literature, theories which contend that our conscious experience is the result of a single consciousness-making process or mechanism in the brain. We argue that the orthodox view is quite wrong: phenomenal experience is not a unity, in the sense of being a single thing at each instant. It is a multiplicity, an aggregate of phenomenal elements, each of which is the product of a distinct consciousness-making mechanism in the brain. Consequently, cognitive science is in need of a multi-track theory of consciousness; a computational model that acknowledges both the manifold nature of experience, and its distributed neural basis

Submillimetre point sources from the Archeops experiment: Very Cold Clumps in the Galactic Plane

Archeops is a balloon-borne experiment, mainly designed to measure the Cosmic Microwave Background (CMB) temperature anisotropies at high angular resolution (~ 12 arcminutes). By-products of the mission are shallow sensitivity maps over a large fraction of the sky (about 30 %) in the millimetre and submillimetre range at 143, 217, 353 and 545 GHz. From these maps, we produce a catalog of bright submillimetre point sources. We present in this paper the processing and analysis of the Archeops point sources. Redundancy across detectors is the key factor allowing to sort out glitches from genuine point sources in the 20 independent maps. We look at the properties of the most reliable point sources, totalling 304. Fluxes range from 1 to 10,000 Jy (at the frequencies covering 143 to 545 GHz). All sources are either planets (2) or of galactic origin. Longitude range is from 75 to 198 degrees. Some of the sources are associated with well-known Lynds Nebulae and HII compact regions in the galactic plane. A large fraction of the sources have an IRAS counterpart. Except for Jupiter, Saturn, the Crab and Cas A, all sources show a dust-emission-like modified blackbody emission spectrum. Temperatures cover a range from 7 to 27 K. For the coldest sources (T<10 K), a steep nu^beta emissivity law is found with a surprising beta ~ 3 to 4. An inverse relationship between T and beta is observed. The number density of sources at 353 GHz with flux brighter than 100 Jy is of the order of 1 per degree of Galactic longitude. These sources will provide a strong check for the calibration of the Planck HFI focal plane geometry as a complement to planets. These very cold sources observed by Archeops should be prime targets for mapping observations by the Akari and Herschel space missions and ground--based observatories.Comment: Version matching the published article (English improved). Published in Astron. Astrophys, 21 pages, 13 figures, 4 tables Full article (with complete tables) can be retrieved at http://www.archeops.org/Archeops_Publicatio